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Abstract 
 
We analyze the relationship between Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and external donors, with 
the aim of contributing to the debate on “mission drift” in microfinance. We assume that both 
the donor and the MFI are pro-poor, possibly at different extents. Borrowers can be (very) poor 
or wealthier (but still unbanked). Incentives have to be provided to the MFI to exert costly effort 
to identify the more valuable projects and to choose the right share of poorer borrowers (the 
optimal level of poor outreach). We first concentrate on hidden action. We show that 
asymmetric information can distort the share of very poor borrowers reached by loans, thus 
increasing mission drift. We then concentrate on hidden types, assuming that MFIs are 
characterized by unobservable heterogeneity on the cost of effort. In this case, asymmetric 
information does not necessarily increase the mission drift. The incentive compatible contracts 
push efficient MFIs to serve a higher share of poorer borrowers, while less efficient ones 
decrease their poor outreach. 
JEL-Codes: O120, O160, G210. 
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1 Introduction
For the last 30 years, the micronance industry has been responsible for a massive growth of
pro-poor nancial services. The growth of the sector and the increasing nancial ows into
Micronance Institutions (MFIs) have stimulate a debate on the evolution of the sector. The
main elements of the recent evolution are the explosion of for-prot and prot-oriented MFIs
and the change in the nature of some external donors (private vs. public). Both these issues
have contributed to fuel the debate on the \mission drift" in micronance. Armendariz et al.
(2011) state that mission drift arises when a MFI \increases its average loan size by reaching out
to wealthier clients neither for progressive lending nor for cross-subsidization reasons. Mission
drift in micronance arises when an MFI nds it protable to reach out to unbanked wealthier
individuals while at the same time crowding out poor clients". Aubert, de Janvry, and Sadoulet
(2009) dene mission drift as a context where \MFIs increasingly tend to work with clients that
are less poor".
However, encouraging protability is not necessarily a sign of abandoning the pro-poor
orientation of micronance. On the contrary, from the origin, nancial sustainability and prof-
itability have been considered as necessary conditions for a healthy development of microcredit
markets. This clearly appears in Yunus (2007), when in its well known book \Banker to the
Poor", he states \If Grameen does not make a prot, if our employees are not motivated and
do not work hard, we will be out of business. (...) In any case, it cannot be organized and run
purely on the basis of greed. In Grameen we always try to make a prot so we can cover all
our costs, protect ourselves from future shocks, and continue to expand. Our concerns are fo-
cused on the welfare of our shareholders, not on the immediate cash return on their investment
dollar." (chapter 11, p. 204). Similarly, in the Key Principles in micronance published by
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) in 2004, nancial sustainability is evoked
as the 4th principle and dened as \necessary to reach signicant numbers of poor people".
In this spirit, observers and policymakers have increasingly put the accent on the necessity for
micronance institutions to be protable, or \nancially" sustainable, raising interest rates and
going through commercialisation to be able to attract private investors (see Cull et al., 2009).
Nonetheless, a report commissioned by Deutschebank research showed that, in 2007, 70%
of MFIs were small start-ups, mostly unprotable, while only the top 150 MFIs were fully
sustainable mature entreprises (Dieckmann et al., 2007). At the same time, the positive view of
commercialization and protability has been challenged in recent years by the critics following
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the news that the largest micronance bank in Latin America, the Mexican Compartamos, was
oering returns on equity of 53%, while charging interest rates exceeding 100% to the poor. In
a famous column appeared in the New York Times on January 14, 2011, Yunus reacted to this
debate denouncing a tendency to \sacricing microcredit for megaprots".
The main diculty when trying to assess the extent of \mission drift" is that it is complicated
to empirically establish whether a micronance institution has indeed deviated from its poverty-
reduction mission. One widely used proxy for poverty is average loan size, but as Armendariz
et al. (2011) point out, the relationship between mission drift and loan size is not easy to tackle,
so that socially responsible investors should be cautious when interpreting empirical evidence on
loan size. Another possible sign of mission drift could be a tendency to practice higher interest
rates. However, Roberts (2013) shows that, although prot oriented MFIs do usually charge
higher interest rate, they are not signicantly more protable, because they tend to have higher
costs. He concludes that his analysis nds \no obvious indication of a mission drift".
We believe that additional theoretical work is needed to understand the phenomenon and
being able to interpret empirical facts. In the present paper, we present a theoretical analysis
aimed at increasing our understanding of the role of donors in aecting mission drift tendencies
in micronance. We propose a model in which both the donor and the MFI are pro-poor,
although they can put dierent weights on the aim of providing credit to the poorest borrowers.
Incentives have to be provided to the MFI to exert costly eort to identify the more valuable
projects and to choose the right share of poorer borrowers (the optimal level of poor outreach).
We characterize the optimal contract proposed to MFIs in the aim of balancing outreach, budget
considerations and MFIs survival.
We consider both the cases of hidden action (eort is not observable) and hidden types (MFIs
have unobservable cost heterogeneity). The two cases are relevant for the sector. For instance,
the report \Micronance in Africa" realised for the United Nations in OSAA and NEPAD
(2013), put the accent on the diculties of operating in a context of lack of transparency and
weak institution, an environment which favor hidden action problems. In addition, the same
report also points out that the donors should promote the diversication of institutions to
\improve range and quality of services, and reduce costs". This suggest the importance of the
role of donors in proposing dierentiated contracts in a context of heterogeneous institutions as
in our framework with hidden types. Hidden type problems are also likely to be very relevant
in context like Latin America, where microcredit providers present a wide range of institutional
diversity and performances (see for instance the recent Report of Trujillo and Navajas, 2014).
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We rst assume that eort is unobservable (hidden action model) assuming that the donor
cannot observe neither the eort level chosen by the MFI, nor the fraction of richer borrowers.
He only discovers the total repayment rate of loans to the MFI. We show that, in this case,
asymmetric information can reduce the share of very poor borrowers reached by loans, thus
increasing mission drift. This happens when the pro-poor orientation of the MFI is weak as
compared to the one of the donor, so that this source of mission drift is more likely to arise in
country in which MFIs are prot oriented. Afterwards, we allow for unobserved heterogeneity
among MFIs: some of them are more ecient than others and the contract proposed by the
donor has to screen among dierent types of MFI (hidden type model). In this case, the
existence of asymmetric information between the donor and the heterogeneous MFIs tends to
increase the poor outreach of the more ecient MFIs while decreasing it for less ecient ones so
that in some case asymmetric information has the eect of lowering the average level of mission
drift (i.e. the share of richer borrowers who are granted a loan).
1.1 Related literature
The question of the relationship between MFIs and external donors has gained importance in
the last year. Surprisingly, as Ghosh and Van Tassel (2013) point out, the existing literature on
micronance has not paid much attention to that question1. An indirectly related literature has
considered the broader question of the relationship between external donors and other recipients
(such as NGOs). For instance, Besley and Ghatak (2001) consider the issue of the optimal
contract between a government and an NGO to carry out a development project, showing how
hold-up problems shape the optimal way to delegate responsibility for providing social welfare
and development services to nongovernmental organizations. Aldashev and Verdier (2009, 2010),
examine the eects of international competition between NGOs to raise funds. They show that
if the level of outside options of NGO entrepreneurs is low enough, increased competition among
NGOs can lead to higher fund diversion, despite the fact that they care about the impact of
their projects.
More recently, the literature has tackled specic issues of micronance. In this context,
Aubert, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2009) focus on the internal organization of MFIs and highlight
the importance of the incentives given to the credit agents. They analyze the optimal contract
in the presence of moral hazard and investigate the issue of mission drift in this context. In
their model, the credit agents are not pro-poor and can under-report repayments so that they
1Most papers are dedicated to the contracting between MFIs and their clients: see Ghatak and Guinnane
(1999), Rai and Sjostrom (2004), Jeon and Menicucci (2011) or Shapiro (2015).
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have to be given the right incentives to investigate the ability and wealth of borrowers. The
MFI can monitor agents. However, when monitoring is costly, a pro-poor MFI can be obliged
to provide the agent with incentives based on repayments thus generating mission drift. While
Aubert, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2009) concentrate on the internal incentives provided by MFIs,
incentive issues are also likely arise in the relationship between MFIs and external donors. In
our paper, we concentrate on this relationship as a source of contract frictions and mission drift.
In our context, we nd reasonable to assume that both the MFI and the donors are pro-poor,
at least to some extent. Although we do not allow the MFI to under-report repayments, in our
framework, incentives need to be provided to have the MFI exerting costly eort to discover
valuable clients' investment projects (while wealth is easily observable by the MFIs which has
better knowledge than the donors of the local conditions). In this context, in addition to moral
hazard problems we also consider adverse selection issues. MFIs are heterogeneous and the
donor cannot perfectly observe their characteristics. In our context, asymmetric information
and contract distortions can have dierent impacts on mission drift.
Ghosh and Van Tassel (2011, 2013) also focus on the relationship between donors and MFIs.
In their rst paper, they present a model in which socially responsible MFIs (their main goal
is to reduce poverty) must be funded by a prot-seeking investor. They nd that competition
among MFIs to obtain external funds has two opposite eects: on the one hand, having to pay
a high rate of return to the external funder raises the interest rates charged to borrowers; on
the other hand, it is also a way to make the funding more ecient by redirecting funding from
inecient MFIs to more ecient ones. If the average increase in the quality of MFIs more than
compensates for the higher interest rates, the competition for external funds is pro-poor. In our
paper, we do not consider competition and we assume that the donor also has a social objective.
We show that the optimal contract proposed to heterogeneous MFIs does not necessarily exclude
inecient MFIs, unless there are very few of them. We characterize separating contract in which
ecient and inecient MFIs are optimally proposed dierent contracts. Moreover, we consider
asymmetric information.
Our approach is thus similar to Ghosh and Van Tassel (2013), who extend the previous
analysis by introducing asymmetric information and socially motivated donors. In their analysis,
the nancial return may be used as a screening mechanism by donors to discriminate between
MFIs, dissuading high cost MFIs to apply for external funding. In our framework, we show
that exclusion of the less ecient MFIs occurs only if their number is small. Otherwise, the
donor may propose dierent contracts to dierent types of MFIs, which may have dierent
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impacts on mission drift. Incentives will be provided not to squeeze out the less ecient MFIs,
but to promote eort and to screen among heterogeneous MFIs proposing dierent contracts
to dierent types of MFIs. In addition, we assume that the donor cares for the survival and
long term viability of MFIs, putting a positive weight on the prot of the MFI. This captures
the idea that leaving some money to a MFI is not completely wasteful for the donor, because
it allows the MFI to survive in the future.
2 The basic model
We consider the relationship between a donor (the principal, \he") and an MFI (the agent,
\she"). The MFI lends a mass 1 of money to a local population of borrowers. The population
of borrowers contains an innity of borrowers, who don't have access to bank lending. Borrowers
are heterogeneous: some of them are richer (they are unbanked but less poor, with a positive
initial wealth level that is not pledgeable and does not allow to access bank lending) and some
of them are poorer (they have no wealth whatsoever). The MFI chooses the proportion  of
the money lent to richer borrowers in his loans portfolio and the weight she puts on nancing
the right level of poorest borrowers measures her pro-poor orientation. In addition, the MFI
has to exert eort to screen out valuable projects, when examining the project proposed by
both richer and poorer borrowers. This eort level e can be interpreted as the share of loans
for which the MFI makes costly eort in order to identify the quality of the project. Without
any screening eort on the MFI side, the expected reimbursement of richer borrowers, RR,
is strictly higher than the expected reimbursement of poorer borrowers, RP , because richer
borrowers have higher collateral. We also assume that the screening eort increases the loans
return by a parameter, R and for simplicity we assume that this parameter is identical for
richer and poorer borrowers.
The expected reimbursement for the projects nanced by the MFI is therefore equal to:
(; e) = RP + (RR  RP ) + Re (1)
With e, the fraction of loans for which the MFI exerts a screening eort. We assume that
the cost associated to the eort e is linear and does not depend on the type of borrowers so that
we can denote it e with  > 0. This eort translates into a monetary cost, because in order
to identify the quality of the borrower projects, the MFI has to pay credit ocers who study
the quality of the projects. The eort provided by the MFI can thus be simply interpreted
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as an eort necessary to examine projects and screen the good ones (with higher repayment
potentials). Alternatively, this can be interpreted as the eort (and the cost) necessary to
provide additional services to the borrowers, thus increasing the potential of their investment
projects.
In order to nance the loans, the MFI has no direct access to the nancial market so that
she has to contract with a donor (the principal). The donor proposes a contract or a menu of
contracts to the MFI. The contract species the refund, T , that the MFI is supposed to pay to
the donor in exchange for the funding and, depending on the informational context that we will
specify the eort level, e.
The donor's utility is an increasing function of the refund he receives from the MFI but the
donor is also concerned by the loan allocation to the right borrowers and the survival of the
MFI. More precisely, we represent his preferences with the following utility function:
V = T   1 + 1

1  (  

1   )
2

+ 2((; e)  e  T ) (2)
T   1 is the budget balance of the lending process for the donor. 1 > 0 is the weight that
the donor puts on the distribution of the loans to the right borrowers.  is the optimal fraction
of loans granted to richer borrowers.  is not necessarily equal to 0. For several reasons, the
donor may prefer that some richer borrowers may also be nanced.2
We choose the formula (1   ( 1  )2) to represent the utility that the donor derives from
lending money to borrowers with a fraction of richer borrowers because we wanted to make it
clear that the donor derives a positive utility from lending this money. In the version we use,
this element that we incorporate in the utility function is always positive. However, after some
normalization, we can show that this is equivalent to considering  (  )2 which is simpler.
((; e) e T ) is the amount of money left to the MFI and 2  0 is a parameter representing
the interest of the donor in the survival of the MFI. The higher (; e) e T , the higher the
net income of the MFI and her probability to survive. We assume that 2 < 1, otherwise the
donor could increase his utility by simply transferring money to the MFI.
2Dierent values for the optimal share of poorer borrowers can derive from natural welfare functions in which
the donor cares for the welfare of the poorest borrowers, while taking into account that richer unbanked borrowers
generates higher expected income. For instance, even if the donor only cares about poorer households, she might
take into account that lending to some richer individual might generate a trickle-down eect, for instance creating
local jobs and increasing the living condition of the poorer borrowers. On the other hand, even if richer households
produce higher expected revenue, the donor would want to nance a certain ratio of poorer borrowers to achieve
a better distribution of wealth. In addition, unbanked wealthier are relatively more abundant than unbanked
poor in many middle-income regions. As noted in Armendariz et al. (2011) the fact that many MFIs in these
region serves a higher share of less poor borrowers does not necessarily means that they all deviated from their
mission.
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The MFI also cares about the ratio of poorer and richer borrowers to whom she grants loans.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the preferred fraction of richer borrowers for the MFI
is the same as for the donor, .3 However, the weight that the MFI gives to this dimension of
his utility 1 > 0, may dier from the 1 of the donor. Eventually, the MFI's utility function is
dened as follows.
U = (; e)  T   e+ 1

1  (  

1   )
2

(3)
Besides, we assume that the MFI has no other external funds at the time she accepts the
contract with the donor so that she also faces a budget constraint:
(; e)  T   e  0 (4)
The MFI does not accept a contract such that this constraint is not satised (perfectly
anticipating her own behavior after having accepted the contract).
3 First case: the donor cannot observe eort e (Hidden action)
In this section, we assume that the donor cannot observe neither the eort level chosen by the
MFI, e nor the fraction of richer borrowers, . However, the donor discovers the reimbursement
level, , obtained by the MFI (the MFI cannot hide the money). We also assume that e can
take any value in the interval [0; 1] and that the value of  is common knowledge. The timing
of the game is the following:
 Step 0: The donor makes an oer (c; T c) to the MFI. The oer may be interpreted as:
I propose you a capital of 1 in order to lend money to local borrowers. If I observe that
you obtain a reimbursement rate equal to c, I ask you a repayment T c. If I observe
a reimbursement rate dierent from c, I ask you a repayment T > (1; 1) and you go
bankrupt.
 Step 1: The MFI accepts the oer or refuses it. If she refuses it, the game is over without
any lending or transfers. If she accepts it, the game continues.
 Step 2: The MFI chooses e and .
3We could also obtain results with an MFI and an 

D and 

MFI 6= D. However, we chose to consider a
unique  in order to show that our results cannot be explained by the dierent view about the optimal fraction
of richer borrowers between the MFI and the donor. Hence, the choice of a unique .
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 Step 3: Borrowers reimburse the loan. (e; ) is common knowledge and the MFI makes
her payment to the donor in accordance with the initial contract and the actual value of
.
This game is aimed at representing, in a simple framework, a situation in which the donor
cannot observe the actual eort made by the MFI to discover good projects (or to propose
valuable services to borrower) nor the actual wealth of the borrowers. On the other hand, we
can think that the donor can more easily observe the total revenue of the MFI and propose a
reimbursement of the funds which is a function of the realized revenues, that, for simplicity, we
assume to be perfectly observable.
Before focusing on the contract and the decisions of the MFI, we rst observe that it is not
necessary to consider values of c such that c < RP + 
(RR  RP ) since both the donor and
the MFI agree that  <  gives a lower utility and a lower reimbursement level than choosing
 = .
Now, let us consider the MFI decision. Since the contract only species c, the reimburse-
ment level, if she accepts it, she will choose among all the pairs (e; ) such that (e; ) = c. In
order to increase the size of the reimbursement rate, increasing the share of rich borrowers is a
substitute to higher eort.
If c  RP +(RR RP ), the MFI will choose an  such that    so that the marginal
cost of increasing  by rising the fraction of richer borrowers is 21RR RP
 
(1 )2 which is strictly
increasing in . The MFI increases  up to the point when further increasing the share of
richer borrowers becomes more costly than increasing eort. The marginal cost of increasing
 by a raise in the eort level is equal to R which is a constant. The two costs are equal
when  =  + (1 
)2(RR RP )
21R
 M . Therefore, there are 3 cases (assuming that T c is small
enough, otherwise the MFI will refuse the contract):
 If c < RP +M (RR RP ), the MFI will choose an eort level 0 and an  equal to c RPRR RP
in order to obtain c.
 If RP + M (RR   RP )  c  RP + M (RR   RP ) + R, the MFI will choose  = M
and an eort level e 2 [0; 1] such that the reimbursement level is equal to c.
 If c > RP + M (RR   RP ) + R, the MFI will choose an eort level 1 and an  equal
to 
c RP R
RR RP in order to obtain 
c.
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This result appears on Figure 3 which represents all the pairs (; e) chosen by the MFI
depending on the c proposed by the donor. When the graph goes northeast, this coincides
with a higher c chosen by the donor. The graph is uniquely characterized by the value of M .
Figure 1: MFI's preferences
Now, the donor. We rst consider the donor's rst best, the choice that he would impose
on the MFI if he could choose the pair (; e) which maximizes his utility while satisfying the
MFI budget constraint, T  (; e)  e. This constraint will always be binding since 2 < 1,
therefore we can assume that in this rst best contract, T = (; e)   e so that the donor's
utility will be equal to:
V = RP + (RR  RP )  1 + Re  e+ 1

1  (  

1   )
2

(5)
This is equal to the utility of the MFI given in (3), except that T (the transfer for the MFI)
is replaced by 1 and the parameter 1 is replaced by 1.
Looking at the formula, we observe that if R < , the donor prefers e = 0, if R > ,
the donor prefers e = 1 and if  = R, the donor is indierent among eort levels. As for the
optimal level of , we can nd it by maximizing (RR  RP ) + 1(1  ( 1  )2). This gives an
optimal  for the donor:  + (1 
)2(RR RP )
21
 D.
Now, the donor cannot actually choose the pair (; e) because he does not observe the choice
of the MFI. We can consider 3 dierent cases.
If R  , the cost of eort is higher than the social benet, the donor prefers (D; 0).
Preferring that the MFI makes no eort, the donor can propose a contract which only cov-
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ers the costs with no eort when the share of richer borrowers is equal to D, (c; T c) =
((D; 0); (D; 0)). The MFI will accept the contract and choose (; e) = (D; 0) so that the
donor will manage to impose his preferred pair to the MFI.
If R >  and D  M , the cost of eort is lower than the social benet and the optimal
 for the donor is higher than the optimal  for the MFI. The donor can obtain that the MFI
chooses (; e) = (D; 1) by proposing a contract (c; T c) = ((D; 1); (D; 1) ). In this case,
the donor can obtain the preferred share of richer borrowers by imposing a high reimbursement
which forces the MFI to exert eort and to push the share of richer borrowers to D.
Now the richest case is when R >  and D < M . Since R > , the donor would prefer
the MFI to make an eort equal to 1 (the social cost of the eort is lower than the social prot).
The donor would also like the MFI to choose an  strictly lower than M since D < M .
However, we already noted that whatever the contract proposed (c; T c), it is never possible to
obtain that the MFI chooses an eort equal to 1 and an  < M since the MFI will always
reduce its eort (with a marginal cost R for an increase in ) and raise the ratio,  of richer
borrower (with a marginal disutility for an increase in  strictly lower than R when  < 
M ).
Therefore, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 The donor proposes a contract (c; T c) to the MFI such that:
 If R  , the donor proposes a contract inducing eort e = 0, setting c = (D; 0) and
T c = (D; 0).
 If R >  and 1 > R 1 (equivalent to D  M ), the donor proposes a contract
inducing eort e = 1, setting c = (D; 1) and T c = (D; 1)  .
 If   R <  + 1(M D)(M+D 2)1  + (M   D)(RR   RP ) and 1  R 1, the
donor proposes a contract inducing eort e = 0, setting c = (D; 0) and T c = (D; 0).
 If R > + 1(M D)(M+D 2)1  + (M   D)(RR   RP ) and 1  R 1, the donor
proposes a contract inducing eort e = 1, setting c = (M ; 1) and T c = (M ; 1).
In all cases the MFI accepts and executes the proposed contract.
If the social cost of eort is high,   R, there is no eort and no distortion due to the
asymmetry of information. The donor can implement the lending policy he prefers even if he
only observes . Even if M < D so that in order to obtain the reimbursement rate (D; 0)
which would coincide with the preferred choice of the donor (D; 0), the MFI would rather make
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strictly positive eort and choose an  strictly lower than D (as can been seen with point A
and A' in Figure 2(a)), the donor can implement (D; 0). The MFI will never make any eort
if she is not compensated for this eort because of her budget constraint. If the donor wants to
implement point A, although the MFI would prefer point A' (with the same ), the donor can
force the MFI to choose A.
The  chosen is not equal to  which may be considered as a mission drift. This is
explained by the tradeo between lending money to poorer borrowers and obtaining a higher
reimbursement rate. Since the cost of an increase in the fraction of richer borrowers at the
neighborhood of  is negligible and the marginal increase in reimbursement rate is constant,
equal to RR  RP , the chosen  will always be higher than .
If the social cost of eort is lower than its social benet,  < R, it is socially optimal to
make an eort equal to 1. However, this eort will not always be implemented. If D is higher
than M , the situation is simple, the donor proposes a contract with an  = D, e = 1 and a
repayment such that the MFI makes no prot. Since (D; 1) is an element of the optimal curve
of the MFI, he will accept the contract and choose (D; 1). This is represented by point B in
Figure 2(a).
Now, if D < M and the donor proposes a contract ((D; 1); (D; 1)  ), the MFI will
not choose (D; 1). He will choose a lower eort level and a higher .
(a) (b)
Figure 2: MFI's preferences and optimal contracts under hidden action.
As we can see on Figure 2(b), if the donor proposes a contract ((D; 1); (D; 1)  ) with
 < M (such as the one denoted by point E in the Figure 2(b)), the MFI will substitute eort
for a higher proportion of richer borrowers (choosing E0). Therefore, the donor cannot do better
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than choosing between 2 solutions. He can either obtain that the MFI chooses D by proposing
a contract ((D; 0); (D; 0)) (corresponding to point F in Figure 2(b)) but no eort will be
made or he can propose ((M ; 1); (M ; 1)  ) (corresponding to point G in Figure 2(b)) so
that the eort level will be equal to 1 but the fraction of richer borrowers will be higher than
the donor's rst best. In the rst case, the eort level is suboptimal, in the second case, the
fraction of richer borrowers is too high, a stronger mission drift. The donor will choose among
these two contracts the one that minimizes his utility loss.
The model thus shows how mission drift is aected by the objectives of the donor and the
MFI. As expected, a high share of richer borrower can depend on the preferences of the donor.
If the donor puts a low weight on the pro-poor mission, then he can decide to push the MFIs
to realize his preferred share of poor borrowers asking for a high reimbursement, so that eort
alone is not enough for the MFI to generate the required revenue and she is pushed to serve
more richer borrowers. The hidden action problems can have an additional (adverse) impact on
the mission drift as compared to the benchmark case of complete information. This happens
when the MFI put relative low weight on the pro-poor mission while the donor is more pro-poor
(as in the case illustrated in Figure 2(b)): in this case, the donor cannot induce the preferred
share of poorer borrowers and mission drift increases (as in point G). Alternatively, the donor
has to renounce to induce high eort (as in point F ). This could also be interpreted as an other
source of mission drift in the sense that, for a given share of richer borrower, the quality of the
service provided by the MFI has to be degraded to satisfy the contract proposed by the donor.
We have thus shown that hidden action is likely to have an adverse eect on mission drift
when the pro-poor orientation of the MFI is weak compared to the one of the donors. On the
contrary, if the MFI is pro-poor, the contract proposed by the donor can induce the desired
level of eort and of the share of reacher borrower desired by the donor so that asymmetric
information has no particular impact on the mission drift.
To drive some implications from the model, it is rst important to note that hidden action
is related to the unobservability of eort. In practice, this problem is more relevant when the
market is less transparent and the information on the functioning of MFIs is hard to gather.
For instance the report \Micronance in Africa" (OSAA and NEPAD, 2013) mentions that a
widespread weakness of African Micronance is the prevalence of governance problems coupled
with the diusion of informal enterprises with scarce access to reliable information. In these
countries, governments and development institutions should thus probably concentrate their
eorts in increasing transparency and support MFIs to improve governance. In addition, we
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have shown that the distortions are driven from the weak pro-poor orientation of MFIs. In
a context in which many MFIs are prot-oriented, like in many Latin American countries for
instance, the presence of hidden action is more likely to worsen the mission drift. But things
should be dierent in Asian countries like India and Pakistan with a traditional focus on the
social mission (Report on Asian Micronance edited by Bedson, 2009). This is not to say that
moral hazard cannot occur in pro-poor MFIs, but in our framework we show that in this case it
is easier for the donors to obtain the desired levels of eort and redistribution through second
best contracting with the MFIs.
4 Second case : the donor cannot observe the type of the MFI
 (Hidden type)
In this section, we consider the case in which MFIs are characterized by unobservable hetero-
geneity. For simplicity, we assume that there are two types of MFIs, a share  of more ecient
ones with low cost of eort L, and a share (1  ) of less ecient MFIs with high cost of eort
H > L. To simplify the analysis, we assume in this section that eort is observable and can
take two values, ei 2 f0; 1g, i = 1; 2. We thus restrict our attention to the hidden type problem
faced by the donor. The donor cannot observe the cost of eort of the MFI but he can oer
a menu of contracts possibly discriminating between the dierent types of MFIs. We assume
that the donor oers a contract depending on the type of MFI (H;L) in such a way that each
MFIs prefers the contract designed for her type rather than the contract designed for the other
type (the Revelation Principle ensures that restricting the attention to this kind of contracts is
without loss of generality). Thus, in step 0, the donor proposes a menu of contracts depending
on the MFI's type (H ; TH ; eH); (L; TL; eL). The other steps are unaected.
Because types are unobservable, the proposed contracts have to satisfy an incentive compati-
bility constraint, to avoid that MFIs mimic a cost of eort dierent from the true one. As well
known, incentives for truthful revelation generally generate additional costs for the principal
(the donor) in terms of rents abandoned to the agents (the MFI) and in terms of contract dis-
tortions. In some cases the principal (the donor) might also decide to oer the same contract
to both types (pooling equilibrium) instead of tailoring the contract on the dierent cost char-
acteristics, when the distortions created by the separating contracts are too large.
The donor maximizes his expected utility:
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V = 
h
TL   1 + 1

1  (
L   
1   )
2

+ 2((
L; eL)  LeL   TL)
i
+(1  )
h
TH   1 + 1

1  (
H   
1   )
2

+ 2((
H ; eH)  HeH   TH)
i
(6)
Under the two budget constraints:
(L; eL)  TL   LeL  0 (7)
(H ; eH)  TH   HeH  0 (8)
And the incentive compatibility constraints:
(L; eL)  TL   LeL + 1(1  (
L   
1   )
2)  (H ; eH)  TH   LeH + 1(1  (
H   
1   )
2) (9)
(H ; eH)  TH   HeH + 1(1  (
H   
1   )
2)  (L; eL)  TL   HeL + 1(1  (
L   
1   )
2)(10)
For standard reasons, at the optimal solution, the budget constraint of type H (8) and the
incentive compatibility constraint of type L (9) will be binding so that we can replace in the
objective function of the donor (6) the values of the transfers:
TH = (H ; eH)  HeH (11)
TL = TH + 1
h
(
H   
1   )
2   (
L   
1   )
2
i
+ ((L; eL)  (H ; eL)) + eH(H   L)(12)
Replacing (11), (12) and (1) in (6) we obtain:
V = 
h
1(1  (
L   
1   )
2) + R+RP + 
L(RR  RP )  LeL   1
i
+(1  )
h
1(1  (
H   
1   )
2) + R+RP + 
H(RR  RP )  HeH   1
i
 (1  2)
h
1[(
H   
1   )
2   (
L   
1   )
2] + eH(H   L)
i
(13)
Because the MFI revenue (i; ei) and her eort ei, i = f1; 2g are observable, maximizing
(6) with respect to T i, (i; ei) and ei corresponds to maximizing with respect to ei and i
equation (13) subject to the residual constraints (7) and (10).
15
The last term in the donor's objective (13), 1[(
H 
1  )
2 (L 1  )2]+eH(H L), represents
the information rent of the most ecient type L. Ecient MFIs get a (weakly) positive rent
from their information advantage. This rent is null if and only if HeH = LeL (which can
occur only if eH = eL = 0) and H = L. The objective function of the donor is decreasing
in the information rent, but its weight in donor's utility is decreasing in 2 (the higher 2 the
more the donor is willing to abandon positive prots to the MFIs to ensure their survival and
thus the less costly is the information rent in terms of utility for the donor). The donor can
choose to induce equal or dierent eort level and propose dierent or equal transfers (and thus
shares i, i 2 fH;Lg).
Proposition 2 Depending on the value of the parameters, the optimal menu of incentive-
feasible contracts takes one of the following forms:
Type 1: The donor induces no eort for both types (eH = eL = 0). The share of richer
borrowers are L = H = D. Transfers are equal for the two types of MFI, TH = TL =
(D; 0).
Type 2: The donor induces eort only from the ecient type L (eH = 0; eL = 1). The
shares of richer borrowers are L = H = D respectively. The transfer from the less ecient
MFI is TH = (D; 0) and TL = (D; 1)   L (or more precisely TL is arbitrarily closed to
(D; 0)  L).
Type 3: The donor induces eort from the two types (eH = eL = 1) and proposes a separating
contracts with dierent shares of richer borrowers L < H and TL < TH .
Proof : see Appendix
Analysis.
Type 1 contract (no eort) is optimal if and only if R < L. Otherwise, the principal
would induce eort of at least the more ecient type L.
If L  R  H the donor proposes a type 2 contract, inducing high eort only for type
L, because eort of type H is too costly to be desirable. This type of contract does not generate
any information rent and allows the donor to obtain its preferred share of richer borrowers D.
Because type H is not incited to exert eort, its contract is not attractive for type L, who will
be indierent between the contract for type H MFI and the one proposed for its type. Similarly,
type H is not attracted by the contract proposed to L because this contract does not allow to
cover a high cost of eort H .
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The richest case is the one in which R > H . In this case, eort of the two types of MFI
is socially ecient, it would always be induced under complete information. However, under
asymmetric information the principal needs to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (9),
which becomes costly because an MFI of type L has a lower cost of eort and an incentive to
pretend to be of type H.
Therefore, in order to obtain that both types of MFI make the eort, it is necessary to
leave an information rent to the ecient MFIs. Even when R > H , it may be the case
that the donor prefers a type 2 contract in which inecient MFIs do not make the eort in
order to reduce the information rent given to ecient MFIs. This will be the case if R   H
(the eciency gain associated to the eort of an inecient MFI) and 1    (the proportion of
inecient MFIs) are low.
However, for reasonable values of the parameters of the model, the optimal contract for
the donor will be a separating type 3 contract in which both types of MFI make the eort.
This requires that R > H which means that eort of the less ecient type also bring some
eciency gain, and that 1   is not too small, which means that there is not a overwhelming
majority of more ecient MFIs. We will elaborate on type 3 contracts in the remaining part of
this section.
Let us rst consider the nature of these contracts. The donor wants both types of MFI to
make the eort. In order to do so, he may propose the following two contracts: (eH ; H ; TH) =
(1; D; (; 1)   H) and (eL; L; TL) = (1; D; (; 1)   L). But both types of MFI would
choose the rst contract pretending to be inecient and obtaining to pay back to the donor
the lower amount of money (D; 1)   H . In order to deter ecient MFIs from choosing the
contract designed for inecient ones, the donor has to make the contract designed for inecient
MFIs less attractive. A natural way to do so, since TH cannot be lower than (D; 1)   H
(otherwise inecient MFIs will not be able to cover their costs) is to increase H . Lowering the
fraction of loans provided to poorer borrowers is costly for the MFI who also cares about the
ratio of poorer and richer borrowers nanced by his loans. Then, an ecient MFI will prefer
a contract with  = D and a higher T rather than the contract designed for inecient MFIs
with both a higher T and a higher . As a result, we observe a stronger mission drift with an
 > D when the MFI is inecient even though both the MFI and the donor would prefer 
to be equal to D. This mission drift is explained by the hidden type of the MFI. The donor
chooses the stronger mission drift as a way to reduce the information rent given to the ecient
type.
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Now, this is not the end of the story. Usually, in the principal-agent theory, the no distortion
at the top rule applies. The contract designed for the most ecient agent is not distorted, not
aected by the asymmetric information (except for the amount of the transfer). A natural
interpretation of this rule in the environment we consider would be that the contract proposed
to the ecient agent should specify an eort level and an  equivalent to the one we would
observe with perfect information: e = 1 and  = D. This is not the case. It is possible here
to obtain a contract which is socially preferable to the one obtained in the perfect information
case.
For the sake of simplicity, we will rst present the intuition for the case 2 = 0. Suppose
that the donor wants both types of MFI to make the eort and  to be equal to D. He
can obtain this outcome with a contract (e; ; T ) = (1; D; (; 1)   H). Both types of MFI
accept the contract and ecient MFIs obtain a revenue equal to H   L. This means that
ecient MFIs are no longer budget constrained. Then, the donor could propose a contract
(1; D   "; (D   "; 1)   H + "(2D 2 ")1
(1 )2 ),
"(2D 2 ")1
(1 )2 , being the MFI's increase in
utility when  decreases from D to D   ". This contract can be interpreted as follows. The
donor proposes to ecient MFIs a reduction of  and an increase in the money that he is paid
back by an amount equivalent to the increase in utility obtained by reducing . This means
that the donor derives both his extra utility by lowering  and the extra utility that the MFI
derives by lowering  (through the increase of T ), a total equal to (1+1)
(D )2 (D " )2
(1 )2 .
If the donor receives all the social surplus associated to a decrease in , his optimal value
of  is no longer D but it coincides with the social optimal value of  (taking into account the
MFI and the donor's preferences): D+MFI   + (1 )2(RR RP )2(1+1) < D so that the donor is
better o if the ecient MFI accepts the contract (as long as D   "  D+MFI) and the MFI
will accept it as long as "(2
D 2 ")1
(1 )2  H  L (otherwise the budget constraint is no longer
satised and she goes bankrupt).
This explains why in the optimal contract designed for the ecient MFI, the  is strictly
lower than D, getting closer to D+MFI , the value of  which maximizes the joint utility of the
donor and the MFI. Distorting downwards the share of richer borrowers served by the ecient
MFI, the donor can obtain an higher surplus, so that he always chooses to do it in the optimal
contract.
Because at the optimal contract the share of richer borrowers is distorted upwards for the
inecient MFIs an lower for the inecient, the total share of richer borrower can be lower
or higher than the one prevailing under complete information. The impact of hidden types on
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mission drift is thus ambiguous. Intuitively, if the share of ecient MFIs, , is high enough, then
the average share of richer borrowers served by the two types of MFI would decrease, because
the downward distortion of  would prevail for a large number of contracts. To see this, we have
computed the share of richer borrower  = L+(1 )H and compared it with the benchmark
level D (obtained under complete information) in anumerical example. As an illustration, if
we set  = 0:2; 1 = 1 = 0:3; 2 = 0; RP = 0:5; RR = 0:1;R = 0:7; H = 0:4; L = 0:1,
then the average share of richer borrowers  is lower than P whenever the share of ecient
MFI  is higher than 0:5. Thus, in this example if more than one half of the MFI are ecient,
mission drift is reduced when information is asymmetric. The same qualitative behavior holds
in general (but of course the particolar threshold of  moves when modifying the values of the
parameters), as shown in the Appendix.
In our context, in which both the MFI and the donor are pro-poor (although they can put
dierent weight on pro-poor orientation and also care about revenues), incomplete information
can deliver a result which is socially more desirable than complete information. The necessity
to discriminate among MFIs types pushes the donor to decrease the share of richer borrower
served by more ecient MFI while demanding higher transfers to compensate for this deviation
from the preferred level D. This allows the donor and the MFI to increase eciency and may
have an unexpected benecial eect on the pro-poor orientation of lending activities (when the
average share of poorer borrowers is increased).
Discussion.
A noticeable feature of the hidden type problem is that the impact of asymmetric information
does not necessarily go in the direction of increasing the mission drift with respect to the
benchmark case of complete information. As shown above, in the separating equilibrium with
dierent shares of richer borrowers, this share is distorted upwards for the inecient MFI but
downwards for the more ecient.
At the separating contract of type 2 with equal shares of richer borrower, the shares are not
distorted with respect to full information. However, the agency problem of the donor induces an
ineciently low level of eort for high cost MFIs. This can be perceived as a higher diculty
for some types of (relatively inecient) MFIs to increases services to poor borrowers, when
contracting with an external donor.
Hidden types issues are particularly relevant in markets in which the level of heterogeneity
among MFI is high. This is for instance in many Latin American countries, as stressed for
instance in the recent report by Trujillo and Navajas (2014). In this context, our analysis could
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oer arguments to suggest that governments and development institutions have a role to play
to help MFIs to build capacity, provide better services and increase eciency. In our model,
to discriminate among MFIs under hidden types, the donor must set the contract such as the
share of richer borrowers is smaller for more ecient MFIs. This allows the donor and the MFI
to increase eciency and may have an unexpected benecial eect on the pro-poor orientation
of lending activities. This indirect positive eect can occur if number of ecient MFIs is large
enough and it is greater when their number increases. Therefore, governments and development
institutions aiming to strengthen the ght against poverty could play a role by helping MFIs to
increase their eciency.
It is also worth noting that the optimal menu of contracts of type 3 could also be interpreted
as follows. For less ecient MFIs , the donor imposes a level H and get all the revenue minus
H . In a sense, the donor covers exactly all the MFI's costs assuming that she is inecient. For
more ecient MFIs, the donor also imposes  but a lower level, L and state a x repayment
rate so that the most ecient MFIs freely choose to exert the eort and keeps a positive margin.4
5 Conclusion
The present paper contributes to the debate on the recent evolution of the micronance sector,
fueled by the explosion of for-prot and prot-oriented MFIs and by a change in the nature
of some external donors (private vs. public). The entry of new market players raises the fear
for a deviation from the poverty-reduction mission, the so-called \mission drift". We build a
model in which we analyze the relationship between donors and MFIs, assuming that both are
pro-poor. Assuming that the eort to screen valuable investment projects is costly, incentives
have to be provided to the MFI by the donor to exert the right eort level and to choose the
desired share of poorer borrowers. We rst concentrate on hidden action issues. We show that,
in this context, asymmetric information can reduce the share of poorer borrowers reached by
loans, thus increasing the mission drift.
In the second part of the paper we concentrate on hidden type issues. Incentives have to
be provided to screen among heterogeneous MFIs, while inducing the optimal level of eort. In
this case, the impact of asymmetric information does not necessarily increase the mission drift.
The share of richer borrower can be distorted upwards for inecient MFIs but downwards for
the more ecient ones. The incentive compatible contract pushes ecient MFI to serve a higher
share of poorer borrowers, while less ecient ones decrease their poor outreach. Our results
4To a certain extent, this is equivalent to a price-cap incentive scheme.
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conrm the idea that mission drift is a complex phenomenon and that observing that MFIs are
serving unbanked wealthier populations should not, as such, be considered as alarming by so-
cially responsible investors and observers. Our model shows a relationship between contracting
under asymmetric information and the level of the mission drift. But this relationship is not
univocal. In markets in which hidden action is likely to be the main issue, our model conrms
that prot oriented MFIs may increase the mission drift. On the other hand, in markets in
which the main problem is unobserved MFI heterogeneity, contract frictions between donors
and MFIs do not necessarily increase the level of the mission drift. The fact that donors push
some types of MFI to increase the share of wealthier borrower can be compatible with a larger
poor outreach for more ecient MFIs, with an ambiguous eect on total mission drift.
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Appendix:
Proof of Proposition 2
Let us rst show that (eH ; eL) = (1; 0) cannot be part of an optimal choice for the donor. Sup-
pose that there exists an optimal menu of contracts for the donor ((eH ; TH ; H); (eL; TL; L))
with (eH ; eL) = (1; 0) for some values of the parameters of the model.
In order to satisfy the incentive constraints, the two following conditions must be satised:
(H ; 1)  TH   H + 1(1  (
H   
1   )
2)  (L; 0)  TL + 1(1  (
L   
1   )
2)
(L; 0)  TL + 1(1  (
L   
1   )
2)  (H ; 1)  TH   L + 1(1  (
H   
1   )
2)
Therefore:
(H ; 1)  TH   H + 1(1  (
H   
1   )
2)  (H ; 1)  TH   L + 1(1  (
H   
1   )
2)
which cannot be veried since L < H . Hence, there cannot exist an optimal menu of
contracts for the donor with (eH ; eL) = (1; 0).
Assume now that there exists an optimal menu of contracts for the donor such that eH =
eL = 0.
Because no eort is made, there is no asymmetric information issue. The donor in order
to maximize his objective function chooses his preferred : D and a transfer equal to the
expected repayment without eort and an  = D for both types: (D; 0).
Consider the case in which the donor would like to impose (eH ; eL) = (0; 1).
Suppose that there were only MFI of type type L and the donor would like them to make
eort. Then, by denition of D and because of the budget constraint, the donor would impose
the following optimal contract (eL; L; TL) = (1; D; (D; 1)   L). On the other hand, if
there were only MFIs of type H and the donor would like them to make no eort, by denition
of D and because of the budget constraint, the donor would impose the following optimal
contract (eH ; H ; TH) = (0; D; (D; 0)). Now, even in the presence of the two types of MFI
exist, these two contracts satisfy the budget constraints and the incentive constraints so that
the donor cannot obtain a higher utility than what he obtains by proposing these two contracts
if he wants to implement (eH ; eL) = (0; 1).
Eventually, suppose that the donor wants both types of MFI to make the eort.
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We rst intend to show that the donor cannot maximize his utility by choosing a menu of
contracts such that H < L or H = L 6= D .
Suppose that the donor can maximize his utility by proposing two contracts with H  L.
Because of the incentive constraints, we must have
TL = TH   1((1  (
L   
1   )
2)  (1  (
H   
1   )
2))
If this equality is not satised, one of the two incentive constraints is not satised.
Besides, the budget constraint of type L can be written: TH  (H ; 1)   H so that the
best contracts the donor can propose for a xed (L; H) with H < L gives him a utility:
(1  )((H ; 1)  1  H   2(1  (
H   
1   )
2))
+((L; 1)  1  H   2(1  (
L   
1   )
2)  1((1  (
L   
1   )
2)  (1  (
H   
1   )
2)))
If we put aside the last term: 1((1  (L 1  )2)  (1  (
H 
1  )
2)), by denition of D, this
expression is maximized choosing H = L = D. Besides, since H  L, the last term is
always negative or null and by choosing H = L = D, the donor minimizes the value of this
last expression putting it equal to zero. Hence, this cannot be maximized by choosing H < L
or H = L 6= D.
Eventually, neither H < L nor H = L 6= D can be part of an optimal menu of contracts
for the donor.
Now we intend to prove that H = L = D, necessarily with TL = TH = (D; 1)   H ,
cannot be part of an optimal menu of contracts for the donor. In order to prove it, we will
propose a pair of contracts that gives a higher utility to the donor.
Consider the following pair of contracts: (1; D; (; 1)  H) and (1; D   "; (   "; 1) 
H + "(2
D 2 ")1
(1 )2   "2) with " strictly positive and arbitrarily small.
The type H will never choose the second contract since this would mean making the eort
and having to repay to the MFI an amount strictly higher than her reimbursement minus H .
She does not respect her budget constraint with this contract and goes bankrupt so that she
chooses the rst contract.
Now, let us verify that the type L prefers the second contract.
With the rst contract, she gets:
H   L + 1(1  (
D   
1   )
2 (14)
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With the second contract, she gets:
H   L + 1(1  (
D   "  
1   )
2   "(2
D   2   ")1
(1  )2 + "
2 (15)
Equal to
H   L + 1(1  (
D   
1   )
2 + "2 (16)
(16) is strictly higher than (15) since "2 > 0.
Now, is the donor strictly better o if a type L MFI chooses the second contract rather than
the rst one?
If a type L MFI chooses the rst contract, the donor gets:
(D; 1)  H   1 + 1(1  (
D   
1   )
2) + 2(
H   L) (17)
If a type L MFI chooses the second contract, the donor gets:
(D   "; 1)  H   1 + "(2
D   2   ")1
(1  )2   "
2 + 1(1  (
D   "  
1   )
2)
+2(
H   L + "2   "(2
D   2   ")1
(1  )2 )
Computing the value of (18)   (17), we obtain:
(D   "; 1)  (D; 1) + "(2
D   2   ")1
(1  )2   "
2 + 1(
(D   "  )2   (D   )2
(1  )2 )
+2("
2   "(2
D   2   ")1
(1  )2 )
Remembering that (D   "; 1)  (D; 1) =  "(RR  RP ), this is equal to:
 "(RR  RP ) + "(1 + 1)
(1  )2 (2
D   2   ")  "2 + 2("2   "1
(1  )2 (2
D   2   ")) (18)
Which can be written:
"[ (RR  RP ) + 1( 2) + 1
(1  )2 (2
D   2   ")  "2( 2)] (19)
Now, by denition, D =  + (1 
)(RR RP )
21
so that (19) is equal to:
"[ (RR  RP ) + (RR  RP ) 1( 2)
(1  )2 (2
D   2   ")  "2( 2)] (20)
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Equivalent to:
"[
1( 2)
(1  )2 (2
D   2   ")  "2( 2)] (21)
If " is suciently small this is strictly positive since D > .
The donor is strictly better o if the type L chooses the second contract rather than the
rst one. Since the type L also strictly prefers the second contract rather than the rst one,
the donor will be strictly better o proposing both contract 1 and contract 2 than if he only
proposes contract 1. Hence, H = L = D, necessarily with TL = TH = (D; 1)  H , is not
an optimal menu of contracts for the donor.
Illustration: non binding budget constraint for type L
Consider the case in which the budget constraint of type L, given in (7), is not binding at the
optimal solution. In this case, the optimal shares of richer borrowers H and L are obtained
maximising the objective of the donor as given in (13) with no further constraints, as long as
L < H . In fact, as long as L < H , the incentive compatibility of type H, (10), is always
satised because type H cannot choose the contract designed for type L without violating the
budget constraint (8). The following result holds:
Result 1 Suppose that H < R and H   L > 1   (1 
)2(RR RP )2
4(1(1 2)+1)2 so that the budget
constraint (7) is not binding. Then there exists a threshold (; 1; 2; 1; RR RP )  ~ 2 (0; 1)
such that:
 If, 0 <   ~ the donor proposes the separating contract with dierent shares of richer
borrowers described in case 3, the MFIs accept the contract and choose
H =
(
D + (1 
)21(1 2)(RR RP )
2(1(1 ) 1(1 2)) ; if   1 
21(1 2)
(1 )(RR RP )+21(1 2)+21 ;
1; otherwise.
(22)
L = D   (1  
)21(1  2)(RR  RP )
21(1 + 1(1  2)) (23)
 If ~ <   1 the donor proposes the separating contract with equal share of richer borrowers
described in case 2. Type L exerts high eort and type H doesn't. Both types choose
H = L = D.
Proof : Suppose for now that (7) is not binding (the condition under which this is satised
will be checked ex-post). Then, the optimal contract from the point of view of the donor is
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obtained by the unconstrained maximisation of (13) with respect to H and L. Because (13) is
a concave function of L and H the optimal solution is obtained from the rst order conditions:
@V
@H
= (1  )(RR  RP   2(
H   )
(1  )2 ) + 1
2(H   )
(1  )2 = 0
@V
@L
= (RR  RP   2(
L   )
(1  )2 ) = 0
Solving the system of rst order conditions (and imposing 0  H  1 and 0  L  1)
gives the values of H and L in (22) and (23). We have now to verify the conditions un-
der which these contracts respect type L budget constraint (7). Replacing these values in (7),
and developing computations we obtain that (7) is not binding if and only if H < R and
H  L > 1  (1 
)2(RR RP )2
4(1(1 2)+1)2 . Equations (22) and (23) thus characterize the best separating
contract from the point of view of the donor when the latter condition is satised.
Now consider the (weighted) average share of richer borrowers is given by  = L + (1  
)H . Replacing for the values of H and L given by (22) and (23) respectively and developing
computations, we nd that  is smaller than D if and only if  > 1  (1 )1(1 2)(RR RP )1(21+21(1 2) (1 )(RR RP )) 
^. Replacing for  = 0:2; 1 = 1 = 0:3; 2 = 0; RP = 0:5; RR = 0:1;R = 0:7; H = 0:4; L =
0:1, we obtain the numerical example given in the main text. We remind here that for very
low values of 1    the contract of type 2 illustrated in Proposition 2 can be preferred by the
donor to the contract of type 3 here illustrated. Replacing for the value of the parameters in
the utility of the donor (13) one can check that this only happens if  > 0:8.
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